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Judicial Protection of the Environment: A
New Role for Common-Law Remedies*
Frank E. Maloney**
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a tendency today to look to the legislatures to provide the
cure for all environmental maladies,' and to overlook or underrate the
potential of common-law remedies to assist in the proper solution of
these problems. Although it is undoubtedly true that in some jurisdic-
tions the common-law remedies have been interpreted so restrictively as
to make them practically useless as tools for environmental protection,
a number of forward-looking courts are developing and applying the law
in a way much more favorable to the environment. Other courts that
have remained uncommitted may be in a position to follow current
trends in the use of common-law remedies for environmental protection.
Hopefully, this survey will suggest additional possibilities for relief in
jurisdictions where the statutory remedies are failing, often because of
insufficient funds for adequate enforcement. Furthermore, even in those
jurisdictions with effective statutory remedies for the protection of the
public interest, common-law remedies still may provide the best, or
indeed the only, means by which an injured individual can be personally
compensated.
* This article had its genesis in a paper presented at the Institute on Significant Developments
in Tort Litigation, which was organized and inspired by Dean John Wade and held at Vanderbilt
University School of Law on October 30, 1970. The material presented here is an expansion of that
presentation.
** Professor of Law and Principal Investigator, Water Resources Scientific Information
Center of Competence in Eastern Water Law, University of Florida Law Center; B.A. 1940,
University of Toronto; J.D. 1942, University of Florida.
1. The following recent federal legislation requires systematic action by all federal agencies
to ensure that environmental values are appropriately weighed in agency decision-making along
with economic and technical considerations. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1970); Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-64 (1970); Department of Transportation
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-41,205, 501,511,514 (1970); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970); Environmental Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1970). Federal agencies, however, sometimes seem less
than enthusiastic in their efforts to enforce these laws. For a discussion of the difficulties faced by
conservation groups seeking to obtain such enforcement see Note, Standing To Challenge Adminis-
trative Action: The Concept of Personal Stake, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 570 (1971). There also
has been speculation that the Refuse Act of 1899 provides standing for citizen suits to abate water
pollution by allowing qui tam actions. E.g., Note, The Refuse Act of 1899. New Tasks for An Old
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II. EARLY COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENTS
As an aid to understanding the place of common-law remedies in
environmental law today, it is appropriate to begin by examining their
early- development, along with the reasons for their frequent failure to
adequately protect the public interest. This failure has been a contribut-
ing factor in legislative attempts to provide greater environmental pro-
tection. The inadequacy of this legislation, in turn, has led a number of
courts to reexamine and refurbish the common-law remedies.
A. Nuisance
Most of the initial common-law cases aimed at the prevention of
environmental pollution were either private or public nuisance actions.
A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of real property,2 and obtaining relief is dependent upon both
proof of damage and a finding that the defendant's activities are "unrea-
sonable. ' 3 A public nuisance action, on the other hand, is available for
injury to the public in the exercise of its common rights.4 The activity
that constitutes a public nuisance is usually a crime, but the existence
of criminal sanctions generally does not make the tort remedy unavaila-
Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 782 (1971). Seven recent federal district court decisions, however, have
refused to permit qui tam actions under the Refuse Act, primarily because another section of the
Act states that litigation will be brought by the Department of Justice. Enquist v. Quaker Oats
Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971); United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327
F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970);
Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala. 1971);
Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Connecticut Action
Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 3 CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER NEWS 419 (1971). See also United
States v. St. Regis Paper Co.,,3 CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER NEWS 419 (1971). There are as yet no
reported appeals. If the unanimity of the district courts is any indication, however, it would appear
that qui tam actions will probably not be allowed under the Refuse Act.
The standing problem, along with the presumption of correctness of administrative action, may
lessen the potential effectiveness of these seemingly broad statutory remedies.
2. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1956).
4. Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34, 38 (Alas. 1965).
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ble. 5 In some cases, involving an act that interferes both with common
rights of the public and with private use and enjoyment of land, a private
as well as a public nuisance action may be available,6 but a private
individual may not maintain the public action in the absence of proof
of special damage to him different in kind from that suffered by the
public at large.7 Absent such special damage, the state, as protector of
the public, is the proper plaintiff.'
The preferred relief against both public and private nuisances is the
injunction because it furnishes a remedy before rather than after damage
occurs. Moreover, in many cases injunctive relief may be the only effec-
tive sanction because provable injury to any one individual is so small
that a judgment for damages would be valuable only to prevent the
defendant from gaining a prescriptive right. An injunction, however, will
be issued only if the plaintiff proves that injunctive relief is necessary
because the threatened injury is irreparable. This would be the case if
the injury could not be adequately compensated for by damages at law,
.or if a multiplicity of suits would result from failure to grant the injunc-
tion.9
An injunction may be refused for several reasons. In comparing the
relative importance of the interests of the parties to determine whether
to grant injunctive relief, a court may deny an injunction on the ground
that the public interest in permitting a particular activity to continue is
of overriding importance despite damage to the plaintiff. This defense
to the issuance of an injunction is sometimes referred to as "the balance
of convenience doctrine,""0 and is often raised in defense of municipal
or governmental operations." Another roadblock, at least against the
prosecution of a public nuisance action, may be a claim that the state,
either by legislative action or by constitutional amendment, has legalized
a type of pollution, thereby lifting it out of the category of a public
nuisance.'" For example, in 1930 Florida added a section to its state
constitution providing a fifteen-year tax exemption to particular indus-
5. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397,48 P. 374 (1897).
6. Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 109 N.W.2d 749 (1961).
7. Strickland v. Lambert, 268 Ala. 580, 109 So. 2d 664 (1959).
8. See, e.g., J.H. Miles & Co. v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1950) (by
implication).
9. Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919).
10. Cohen v. City of Houston, 176 S.W. 809, 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
11. See, e.g., Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 31-32, 183 P. 342, 346 (1919).
12. See Juergensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and Protection of the Environment, 6
U.B.C.L. REV. 215 (1971); 25 TEXAS L. REv. 96 (1946).
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tries as an inducement for establishing plants in Florda. In the case of
National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton13 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that this exemption necessarily granted the polluter
immunity from public nuisance suits. Similar results were reached by the
Florida- court in subsequent cases involving the drilling of oil wells in
tidal waters pursuant to an oil lease statute" and the operation of an
airport under a municipal ordinance.15 This defense also has been applied
to operations in areas zoned for commercial use.1"
During the laissez-faire period, courts tended to overprotect the
right to own and use private property and failed to recognize the ecologi-
cal consequences of pollution. This led them, for the most part, either
to deny the existence of the nuisance altogether, 7 or to refuse an injunc-
tion because the economic importance of the polluter's operations
caused the equities to be balanced in favor of the polluter. Richard's
Appeal,'1 which legalized the status of Pittsburgh as the "Smoky
City,"' is an early example of this propensity to deny the plaintiff all
relief except a remedy by way of money damages, which is clearly inade-
quate."0
The continued solicitude of the courts for the-protection of private
property rights at the expense of the environment also manifested itself
in a series of New York cases involving air pollution caused by the huge
Donner-Hanna Coke Plant at Buffalo. In the first of these cases, decided
in 1931, the court classified pollution from 50 coke ovens as only a
"petty annoyance" to a neighboring homeowner and reached the con-
clusion that air pollution is "indispensable to progress."'21 Twenty-five
years later, when the plant was operating 250 ovens, the same court held
that so long as the plant contained properly operated "modern" control
equipment, an unconstitutional taking of its properties would result
13. 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939).
14. Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So. 2d 388 (1944).
15. Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947) (decision also based on laches
on the part of the plaintiff who did not complain until over $1,000,000 had been spent on construc-
tion of the airport). For a discussion of recent cases finding inverse condemnation has taken place
under similar circumstances see Note, Airspace-Aircraft Noise-Inverse Condemnation Absent
Overflight, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES L. J. 561, 565-67 (1968).
16. Gerring v. Gerber, 28 Misc. 2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
17. Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sander-
son, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
18. 57 Pa. 105 (1868).
19. Id.at1ll-12.
20. If injunctive relief is available, damages for past harm can usually be obtained as the
adjunct to the specific equitable relief given.
21. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y.S. 403 (Sup. Ct. 1931),
affd, 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932).
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from the limitation of its operations to comply with a Buffalo smoke
ordinance. 22 The emissions, therefore, were classified as "unavoida-
ble," 2 and the company continued to be safe from prosecution. In 1939
the New York Court of Appeals again applied this principle to smoke
from the SS Queen Mary in People v. Cunard White Star Ltd.
24
Not all of the early cases, however, treated the environment so
harshly. In 1907, for example, the Supreme Court partially enjoined
operations of the Tennessee Copper Company at Copper Hill, Tennes-
see, insofar as they affected the State of Georgia and its citizens;25 in the
first major decision in this case the Tennessee Supreme Court had bal-
anced the equities in favor of the polluter.26 Moreover, in the 1913 case
of Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co.,27 the New York Court of Appeals
ordered the closing of a multi-million dollar pulp mill to prevent the
destruction of a small waterway, which it was polluting.
B. Other Common-Law Remedies
Although the nuisance action was the primary common-law
weapon against environmental pollution, it was not the only one. Ac-
tions in trespass, negligence, strict liability, and for the protection of
riparian rights were also used, but with relatively little success.
1. Trespass.-In theory at least the action for trespass to real
property should have provided the best environmental protection, since
neither proof of intent nor of negligence was required for a finding of
liability. 2 While the trespass action was used successfully in a few
cases,2" two difficulties prevented wider utilization of this remedy. First,
trespass was available only for direct invasions of a neighbor's land. A
direct flow of water, for example, could result in a trespass action .3 For
the destruction or diversion of a stream that ultimately flooded the
22. People v. Savage, I Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 309 N.Y.
941, 132 N.E.2d 313 (1955).
23. Id. at 342, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
24. 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939).
25. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
26. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
27. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), modifying 145 App. Div. 1, 129 N.Y.S. 391 (1911).
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 13.
29. E.g., W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953) (defendant allowed
poisonous mine water deposited in a stream to overflow onto plaintiff's land); McKee v. Delaware
& H. Canal Co., 125 N.Y. 353, 26 N.E. 305 (1891) (overflow onto plaintiff's land caused by
defendant's dam constitutes trespass).
30. Whaler v. Norton, 92 App. Div. 368, 86 N.Y.S. 1095 (1904).
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plaintiff's land, however, the only remedy would have been an action on
the case, generally in nuisance.3 1 Secondly, in order to find that an
invasion was direct, it must have involved an object big enough to be
seen with the naked eye.3 2 Interference with the plaintiff's possession
resulting from the settling of invisible effluents could be reached only
through the nuisance action.33 Although these restrictions are under at-
tack today, for centuries they relegated the trespass action to a minor
role in environmental protection.
2. Negligence.-The negligence action is primarily a remedy de-
signed to provide compensation to an injured individual rather than
protection of the public interest, and, as such, normally does not result
in injunctive relief. Thus, while the negligence action may result in a
recovery of damages, 34 it has been of relatively little assistance in the
overall fight against pollution.
3. Strict Liability.-The doctrine of strict liability affords another
possible remedy for environmental damage. In the English case of
Rylands v. Fletcher,3 which established the strict liability concept, plain-
tiff was allowed to recover damages for the flooding of his property by
waters flowing from defendant's property. In affirming this decision of
the Exchequer Chamber, the House of Lords, emphasizing the abnormal
and inappropriate nature of defendant's conduct 36 limited the holding
to things that escaped from defendant's land because of its "nonnatural
use." Many of the nineteenth century American cases rejected the strict
liability doctrine altogether as inappropriate to the development of a new
country.37 Later, however, a few courts allowed recovery of damages in
cases involving ultrahazardous activities such as fumigation with cya-
31. Butala v. Union Elec. Co., 70 Mont. 580, 226 P. 899 (1924); Suter v. Wenatchee Water
Power Co., 35 Wash. 1, 76 P. 298 (1904).
32. E.g., O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. Ry., 38 Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911); Burtlett v.
Grasselli Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
33. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
34. American Cyanamid Co. v. Sparto, 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959); Hagy v. Allied Chemi-
cal & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953). Another difficulty with the negligence
remedy is the fact that even when negligence is established or conceded, it has often proved difficult
to establish the necessary causal connection between the pollution and the harm to the plaintiff.
E.g., Rogers v. Bond Bros., 279 Ky. 239, 130 S.W.2d 22 (1939).
35. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
36. L.R. 3 H.L. at 338. For an extensive discussion of this case see W. PROSSER, supra note
2, § 78.
37. E.g., Everett v. Hydraulic Flume Tunnel Co., 23 Cal. 225 (1863); Shrewsbury v. Smith,
66 Mass (12 Cush.) 177 (1853); Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow. 175 (N.Y. 1828); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 78.
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nide gas, 31 the drilling of oil wells3 9 or emission of noxious gases in
urban areas.40 Nevertheless, the limitation of this remedy to abnormally
dangerous or ultrahazardous activities4' has severely limited its
usefulness.
4. Riparian Rights.-Although it was not available as a remedy
in all kinds of environmental suits, the assertion of riparian rights, at
least in some states, provided an additional means of stopping stream
pollution. Under the natural flow doctrine, which originally predomi-
nated in the Eastern states, each riparian owner was entitled to have
water reach him undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in quality,
subject to the domestic uses of upper riparians.4 2 This rule favored the
development of mill dams as sources of power and, at the same time,
created a cause of action for injunctive relief to prevent any pollution
beyond that resulting from domestic uses, even if the lower riparian was
not actually using the water.13 With the advent of steam power, the
natural flow doctrine was replaced in most jurisdictions by the doctrine
of reasonable use, which permitted streams to be used as receptacles for
municipal and industrial wastes. Under this latter doctrine, upper ripari-
ans can make reasonable consumptive uses of the water, and the lower
riparian becomes entitled only to have his water kept free from unrea-
sonable pollution.4 The courts have not found pollution to be unreason-
able unless the harm to lower riparians resulting from the polluter's
conduct outweighs the utility of the activity. As a result, injunctions were
denied in most of the early sewage disposal cases because of the supposed
utility of the sewerage company's operations.15 In the case of Parker v.
38. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
39. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928); Berry v. Shell
Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934), rehearing denied, 141 Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1935).
40. Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
41. RESTATEIENT OFTORTS §§ 519-20 (1938).
42. Cole v. Bradford, 52 Ga. App. 854, 184 S.E. 901 (1936); Dougan v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 141 Kan. 554,43 P.2d 223 (1935).
43. See, e.g., Mann v. Willey, 64 N.Y.S. 589 (App. Div. 1900); Note, Statutory Treatment
of Industrial Stream Pollution, 24 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 302, 306 (1956).
44. See F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 322
(1968). The following statement of this rule is found in an early Florida case involving pollution of
an underground stream: "The right to the benefit and advantage of the water flowing past one
owner's land is subject to the similar rights of all the proprietors on the banks of the stream to the
reasonable enjoyment of a natural bounty, and it is therefore only for an unauthorized and unrea-
sonable use of a common benefit that anyone has just cause to complain." Tampa Waterworks
Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 595, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896).
45. E.g., State ex rel. Harris v. City of Lakeland, 141 Fla. 795, 193 So. 826 (1940). See
generally Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern States, Particularly
as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159 (1952).
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American Woolen Co.," however, an injunction was granted in a juris-
diction following the reasonable use doctrine when serious pollution was
caused by a woolen mill.
Once the switch from the natural flow to the reasonable use doctrine
had been made, the legal criteria for relief from stream pollution became
indistinguishable from the rules governing nuisance actions. Conse-
quently, the courts began to employ nuisance terminology when dealing
with stream pollution, and in 1970 the American Law Institute relegated
pollution control to the field of nuisance.4 7 In light of these changes, the
usefulness of the riparian rights doctrine as a tool for pollution control
has declined almost to the vanishing point.
III. REFURBISHING THE COMMON-LAW TOOLS
In the absence of effective statutory regulation, 4 conservationists
increasingly fell back on private lawsuits during the 1960's in their
attempts to protect the environment. They have been successful in a
number of recent cases in which the courts appear to have reversed their
traditional bias favoring exploiters of the environment. These cases have
begun the process of revitalizing the common-law remedies.
One of the most important recent cases is Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 49 decided by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1960. The com-
plainant had brought a trespass action because invisible air-borne fluo-
ride particulates were settling on his property. In holding for the plaintiff
46. 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907).
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 840 (Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970).
48. With the early failure of the common-law actions as tools for controlling pollution,
aggrieved citizens turned to the state legislatures and Congress for relief. Numerous statutes were
enacted prohibiting air and water pollution, but unfortunately they proved ineffective. For example,
the Federal Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 401-13 (1970), has been inexistence since 1899.
The Act prohibits the discharge of "refuse matter other than that flowing from streets and sewers
in a liquid state" into or on the banks of any navigable waters in the United States. 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Until recently, however, the term "refuse" was construed so restrictively by
the courts that the act was of little help. E.g., United States v. Delvalle, 45 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. La.
1942) (accidental discharge of valuable fuel oil held not to constitute a discharge of refuse). Many
of the state anti-pollution statutes, while containing criminal penalties, did not provide for injunc-
tive relief. Polluters were happy to pay the small penalties as a cost of doing business. Moreover,
until the 1960's, the tendency at both state and federal levels was to provide some legal authority
but not the financial support necessary for effective enforcement. See F. Malony, Water Pollution
Study for the State of Tennessee, (1971) (unpublished study on file with the Tehnessee Department
of Public Health, Division of Water Quality Control).
49. 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
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and rejecting what it called the "dimensional test" the court stated:
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet peered into the
molecular and atomic world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion
through unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a tresspass can
result only from a direct invasion . ... [W]e may [now] define trespass as any
intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession,
whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which
can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicists.
The court also decided that the invasion was direct rather than indirect
or consequential, 5t thus satisfying the old directness requirement of tres-
pass. Furthermore, in holding that the intrusion constituted a trespass,
the court stated that the characterization of the defendant's conduct as
careless, wanton and willful, or entirely free from fault was immaterial. 52
This imposition of strict liability through the use of trespass in what
traditionally has been regarded as a nuisance action opens a new door
for environmental protection, but it has not occurred without criticism.
5 3
Perhaps foreseeing this criticism, the Martin court suggested the use of
"a weighing process, similar to that involved in the law of nuisance" as
a means of rejecting cases in which the complainant's injuries were de
minimis.54 Such reasoning, of course, flies in the face of centuries of
jurisprudence that developed the absolute nature of trespass law, 55 and
it indicates some of the dangers involved in utilizing the trespass remedy.
Nevertheless, the Oregon court has not retreated from its.,position with
regard to the trespass doctrine, as evidenced by the 1968 case of Davis
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,5 which also involved air pollution.
In the 1962 case of Thornburg v. Port of Portland,57 the Oregon
Supreme Court utilized another innovative technique involving the appli-
cation of condemnation principles to the low-altitude flight of airplanes.
The court held that airplanes flying low over and near the plaintiff's
home, which was located some 6,000 feet from the end of a runway,
constituted a compensable taking of his property. The result was based
50. Id. at 93-94, 342 P.2d at 793.
51. Id. at 101, 342 P.2d at 797.
52. Id. at 102, 342 P.2d at 797-98.
53. 45 CORNELL L.Q. 836 (1960); 39 TEXAS L. REv. 243 (1960). See also Comment, Oregon's
Statutory and Common-Law Efforts to Control Air Pollution: An Analysis and Comparison, 50
ORE. L. REv. 85 (1970).
54. 221 Ore. at 98, 342 P.2d at 795-96.
55. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, ToRTs 326 (1956); Note, Torts-Remedy for Trespass
Where No Injury Is Shown, 39 Ky. L.J. 99, 100 (1950).
56. 251 Ore. 239,445 P.2d481(1968).
57. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
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on the theory that a nuisance could amount to a "taking" for which an
injured landowner must be compensated under principles of inverse con-
demnation. This extended the inverse condemnation concept from cases
involving taking by trespass5 to taking by interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. In a later reconsideration of the case the court held
that, since the interference was substantial, it was error to instruct the
jury to take into consideration the utility of the airport in determining
the amount of damages to be awarded, because that sum should have
been based solely upon the decrease in the fair market value of complain-
ant's property.59 Thus, in Martin the Oregon court surprisingly has
suggested the appropriateness of a balancing process in trespass, but has
refused to employ it in Thornburg, a nuisance suit, where such balancing
is normally allowed.
The Thornburg case also illustrates the usefulness of the nuisance
action in avoiding the defense of governmental immunity.6" In some
jurisdictions that still recognize this defense the nuisance approach may
be used to counter a plea of municipal immunity in the performance of
a governmental function, which might have been interposed if the action
had been brought on a negligence theory.61 In the 1961 South Dakota
case of Greer v. Lennox,6" for example, the court found that a city dump,
operated so negligently as to breed large numbers of rats which overran
the plaintiff's farm, was "a private nuisance, unprotected by governmen-
tal immunity."'63 This characterization of the nuisance as "private"
rather than public also served to avoid the defense that governmental
authorization of the dump excluded it from the category of a public
nuisance. Other jurisdictions, however, have recognized the defense of
governmental immunity in nuisance actions arising out of negligence. 4
58. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). Contra, United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946); Batten v. United States, 292 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1961).
59. 244 Ore. at 74,415 P.2d at 753; see 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 561 (1968).
60. For a current survey of the status of governmental immunity in all 50 states, with
emphasis on changes since 1965, see 19 DEFENSE L.J. 607-32 (1970); Note, Assault on the Citadel:
De-Immunizing Municipal Corporations, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 832, 859 n.4 (1970). See also 18
E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.47 (3d ed. 1963); Van Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919.
61. E. MCQUILLEN, supra note 60; W. PROSsER, supra note 2, § 131.
62. 79 S.D. 28, 107 N.W.2d 337 (1971), noted in 7 S.D.L. REv. 174 (1962).
63. Id. at 32, 107 N.W.2d at 339.
64. Sheeler v. Waterbury, 138 Conn. 111, 82 A.2d 359 (1951); Karnasiewicz v. New Britain,
131 Conn. 691, 42 A.2d 32 (1945); see Wilbourne, Municipal Nuisance Liability: A Problem in
Characterization, 38 CONN. B.J. 51 (1964).
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Another problem that has faced those seeking to protect the envi-
ronment has been the difficulty of satisfying the plaintiff's burden of
proof. This frequently involves complicated scientific analysis of infor-
mation in the control of the defendant polluter. A few courts have recog-
nized this obstacle and are seeking to aid the plaintiff. In the 1963 case
of Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 5 a federal district court sitting
in Oregon took the position that once the plaintiff proved damages, the
burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to the defendant pollu-
ter, requiring a showing that the injury was either unavoidable or so
prohibitively expensive to avoid that alleviating it would deprive the
defendant of the use of its property.66 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
adopted a similar rule in a 1966 case involving condemnation of a right
of way through a wildlife preserve.67 These cases may reflect the begin-
ning of a trend toward placing the burden on the knowledgeable party
to come forward with technical evidence.
The issue of punitive damages against a polluter was considered in
another significant case, McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,6" in which
the Supreme Court of Oregon again broke new ground, approving an
award of punitive damages after finding that the defendant intentionally
emitted fumes from its paper mill that damaged the plaintiff's
property.69
An important development on another front is the recent defini-
tion of public nuisance by the American Law Institute (ALI) in section
821 B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Although many of the
older cases supported a proposed definition that would have restricted
the public nuisance action to a "criminal" interference with a common
right, Dean John W. Wade, in his capacity as the newly appointed
Reporter, decided to substitute the adjective "unreasonable" to avoid
unduly restricting the development of environmental law."0 This substi-
tution and Dean Wade's proposal for an addition to section 821C that
would allow citizens to maintain proceedings to enjoin or abate a public
nuisance if they had standing to sue as representatives of the general
65. 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
66. Id. at 174.
67. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130
(1966). On remand, however, Texas Transmission apparently met the burden imposed upon it, and
the court upheld a finding in its favor. 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967).
68. 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966).
69. In Davis v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 251 Ore. 239, 245, 44 P.2d 481, 484 (1968), however,
the same Oregon court set aside an award of punitive damages because the trial court had failed to
apprise the jury "of the utility of defendant's operations and its efforts, as compared with others
similarly engaged, to prevent damage to surrounding properties."
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 821B, at 11 (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1971).
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public or in citizens' actions, 71 were both adopted by the ALI at its 1971
meeting. These developments should broaden the scope of the public
nusiance action and also encourage courts and legislatures to expand
standing to sue in such suits.
Another development in recent years has been increasing reexami-
nation of the balance of convenience doctrine. In the Renken case, 7 the
federal court refused to withhold injunctive relief against the emission
of fluoride gas from a 40,000,000 dollar aluminum plant with a gross
annual payroll of 3,500,000 dollars even though the damage to any single
orchard was substantially less than 10,000 dollars. The court condi-
tioned continuation of operations upon the installation of expensive
precipitators within a period of one year. Similarly, in Department of
Health v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Cohzmission,73 a New Jersey court
ordered the Commission to cease polluting the waters of Upper New
York Bay, despite the high cost of purification devices. It is also signifi-
cant to note that in both of these cases the courts held that the existence
of antipollution statutes did not preempt injunctive relief under preexist-
ing common-law remedies. 74 This treatment of statutory controls as an
adjunct to and not a replacement of common-law remedies should pro-
vide further encouragement to environmentalists.
In the 1966 case of Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp.,75 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire reinforced the nuisance remedy by holding
that a statute allowing a polluter ten years to meet a statutory stream
pollution standard did not bar equitable relief on the theory of private
nuisance. The court further stated in dictum that legislation permitting
the continuation of a private nuisance would be an attempt to sanction
an unconstitutional taking of private property for a nonpublic purpose,
and that an order requiring immediate cessation of all pollution might
be entered if no other means of abating the private nuisance was availa-
ble. 76 The case seems soundly decided since legislative pollution stand-
ards, like the legislative prohibitions used to set the standard of care
in negligence actions, set only minimum requirements, and when more
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821C, comment on subsection (2) at 18-19
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
72. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
73. 100 N.J. Super. 540, 242 A.2d 675 (1968), affd per curiam, 105 N.J. Super. 565, 253
A.2d 577, cert. denied, 54 N.J. 561, 258 A.2d 13 (1969).
74. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F. Supp. 169, 175 (D. Ore. 1963); Department
of Health v. Passaic Sewerage Comm'n, 100 N.J. Super. 540, 546-48, 242 A.2d 675, 679-80 (1968).
75. 107 N.H. 131,218 A.2d 360 (1966).
76. Id. at 134-35, 218 A.2d at 362-63.
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care is required to meet the common-law standard, failure to exercige it
quite properly results in liability. 77 Moreover, the result is a heartening
one for environmentalists who have tired of "waiting for Washington ' 78
or state antipollution agencies to provide satisfactory relief.
Although the previously discussed cases and the action by the ALI
are encouraging from the standpoint of environmental protection, not
all courts have adopted an enlightened approach. In Crowther v. Sea-
borg 7 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
refused to lighten the plaintiff's burden of proving irreparable damages
from a proposed underground nuclear blast, which was designed to in-
crease natural gas production. Moreover, when the complainants
sought to prevent flaring of the gas contained within the cavity created
by the permitted nuclear detonation, the federal district court again
denied an injunction, testing the AEC action only by the requirement
that it must not be "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 80
This required the complainants to meet the extremely difficult burden
of establishing that the AEC radiation protection standards were "not
reasonably adequate to protect life, health and safety." 81 Although the
burden-shifting approach of the Renken case seems better calculated to
protect the public health and safety when the information necessary to
set standards is highly technical and peculiarly within the knowledge
and expertise of the responsible agency, it is contrary to the normal
presumption of regularity in agency action.
82
Another regressive opinion is found in a recent air pollution case,
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., in which the New York Court of
Appeals balanced the equities in favor of a polluter with a 45,000,000
dollar investment and a large payroll. Employing a conditional injunc-
tion, the court licensed the pollution in perpetuity by authorizing pay-
77. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 34 Ohio App. 259, 171 N.E. 39 (1929) (compliance
with statutory requirements for hotel exits did not foreclose possibility of common-law negligence
in providing inadequate exits); Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933) (motorist giving
statutorily required hand signal did not necessarily exercise reasonable care).
78. E.g., Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting For Washington,
5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 32 (1970).
79. 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969).
80. Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1220 (D. Colo. 1970).
81. Id. at 1235. A total of 500 to 1,000,000 standard cubic feet of gas was scheduled to be
released into the atmosphere in the flaring program over a period of 9 to 12 months. Id. at 1222-
23. Plaintiffs alleged that the safety standards set by the AEC and its plans for protecting the public
from radiation hazards during the flaring were inadequate.
82. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.10 (1958).
83. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
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ment of damages for future injury as an alternative to injunctive relief.
As Judge Jason pointed out in a well-reasoned dissent, the majority was,
in effect, wrongfully employing the doctrine of inverse condemnation,8
which previously had been used only in behalf of such entities as the
elevated railroads, whose operations were sufficiently in the public inter-
est to justify direct condemnation proceedings.5 In Boomer, however,
the doctrine was applied to an activity operated primarily for private
gain that could not have employed direct condemnation proceedings.
The court also rejected the better-reasoned precedent in Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co.,8" in which the proportionate damage to each of the
parties was considered and an injunction granted to a plaintiff with
substantial injuries even though dollar-wise they were infinitely smaller
than the investment of the defendant. In protecting the defendant, the
Boomer court emphasized economic disparity rather than the true equi-
ties of the case. While it is true, as emphasized by the majority, that the
air pollution problem before the court was an industry-wide phenome-
non, failure to impose even future sanctions on the defendant because
of lack of a presently effective emission control system seems to sell out
the right of the public to clean air much too cheaply. As Judge Jason
so cogently stated, it eliminates "the incentive to alleviate the wrong." 7
Unfortunately, although the Boomer case has provoked a great deal
of critical commentary, 8 it does not stand alone. In 1967 the Supreme
84. Id. at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
85. Pappenheim v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 128 N.Y. 436 (1891).
86. 208 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 805 (1913), modifying 145 App. Div. 1, 129 N.Y.S. 391 (1911);
see text accompanying note 23 supra.
87. 26 N.Y.2d at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321. For a telling criticism of
the case on this basis see Note, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL L.
REv. 861, 873-75 (1970). It is, of course, true that the elimination of pollution, while usually
possible, may be so expensive that other societal interests must be weighed before forcing immediate
action. One estimate places the annual cost of adequate controls on air and water pollution in the
United States at over $5,000,000,000 in capital investments and approximately $8,000,000,000 in
operating costs. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 72. Is it necessary that this price be paid if we want
clean air and water? The Attorney General of Michigan has estimated that a much lesser sum spent
on research eventually could reduce costs by half, at which point society might be able to bear the
price. Interview with Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, at Indiana University Indian-
apolis Law School, Oct. 16, 1970. A judicial tightening of the anti-pollution remedies might help
encourage that research.
88. E.g., Note, Nuisance-Air Pollution-Permanent Damages Awarded in Lieu of
Injunction, 39 FORDHAMt L. REV. 338 (1970); Note, Individual's Rights to Injunction in a Private
Nuisance Suit, 19 KAN. L. Rav. 549 (1971); Note, Environmental Law-Nuisance-Injunctive
Relief Denied in Private Action for Nuisance Caused by Industrial Pollution, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
919 (1970); Note, Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance, 49 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1971); Note,
No Injunctive Relief in New York Against a Private Nuisance When Defendant's Comparative
Financial Hardship Outweighs the Injury to Complainant, 21 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1243 (1970); 16
N.Y.L.F. 666 (1970).
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Court of Iowa adopted a similar approach in Bates v. Quality Ready-
Mix Co.," by awarding a continuing payment so long as the pollution
continued. This remedy is slightly better than that in Boomer, because
it leaves some incentive to continue research on pollution control devices.
Unless such payments are really substantial, however, they will do little
to encourage investment in research looking toward technological im-
provements.
In a number of other recent cases, courts have employed the so-
called "state of the art" test to refuse injunctive relief if the polluting
industries were using the most modern antipollution control methods
available." Moreover, an Iowa case seems to say that an individual can
surrender his right to pure air simply by electing to live in a city that
has air pollution.9 These cases have removed all incentives for antipollu-
tion research and, hopefully, are on the wane.
Recent cases involving damage claims for personal injuries also
demonstrate a more liberal attitude toward the use of common-law
remedies. Such suits, of necessity, will not have as substantial an effect
in bringing about pollution abatement as injunctive relief, but a more
favorable judicial attitude toward injured plaintiffs will tend to encour-
age more care on the part of potential violators. In the negligence area,
the 1958 case of Greyhound Corp. v. Blakely 2 is a step in the right direc-
tion. In that case the Ninth Circuit liberally applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to permit recovery by a plaintiff who suffered carbon
monoxide poisoning while riding on defendant's bus. Refusing to require
the plaintiff to establish the amount of carbon monoxide in the bus, the
court found that the instrumentality causing the injury was the bus,
which was clearly under the exclusive control of the defendant, rather
than the carbon monoxide, which arguably was not. The court said, "De-
fendant was the only one who could explain the cause of the presence of
the carbon monoxide in the bus,"'9 3 and, in effect, shifted to the defen-
dant the burden of proving that it was not negligent. This use of res ipsa
loquitur9" is in refreshing contrast to the excessive burden placed on the
plaintiff when an agency is being sued.
89. 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967).
90. E.g., Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 83 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960); People v. Peterson,
31 Misc. 2d 738, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Erie County Ct. 1961).
91. Riterv. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710,82 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
92. 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958), noted in 7 CURRENT ED. 24 (Feb. 1960).
93. 262 F.2d at 408-09.
94. Accord, Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958).
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Finally, the strict liability doctrine recently has begun to provide
another avenue for recovering damages without proof of fault on the
part of a polluter.9 5 The traditional requirement that the activity not only
be hazardous but also unusual or not well suited to the area,9" along with
the earlier reluctance of American courts to adoptthe doctrine, 7 has
made recovery on this theory infrequent in the past. Today, however, the
strict liability theory is becoming another tool for environmental protec-
tion against harm resulting from improper use of pesticides9" and other
dangerous chemicals.99 As nuclear reactors become more common, strict
liability may provide a means of avoiding the otherwise difficult burden
of proving negligence or fault in their operation.10
IV. CONCLUSION
Common-law remedies administered by the judiciary have long
provided a potential for pollution control. In the past, however, courts
reflecting the popular mood at the time, were in general unwilling to use
them. This reluctance usually led to a judicial balancing of the equities
that favored industrial polluters. A new public awareness of the dangers
involved in pollution has now led to a different order of priorities that
is contrary to these judicial precedents. Does this mean that the judiciary
has forfeited its opportunity for leadership in the present-day movement
for a clean environment?
There are those who believe that court-developed remedies, designed
for a simpler age, cannot cope with our present-day problems.' Some
think the ultimate answer to the ecology crisis is governmental regula-
tion of resource allocation and development. 2 Still others suggest that
the best hope for pollution control lies in efficient enforcement of a
statutory program.0 3 On the other hand, some commentators so distrust
95. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigating with cynanide gas).
96. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 78. The use of chlorine gas in an industrial plant was found
not to be unusual or extraordinary in Fritz v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 75
A.2d 256 (1950).
97. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
98. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Loe v. Lenhardt,
227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
99. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (cyanide gas).
100. W. PPROSSER, supra note 2, § 78. When cases involving nuclear energy reach the courts,
the author predicts that no court will refuse to recognize and apply the principle of strict liability.
101. Reitze, Wastes, Water and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 5, 65 (1968).
102. Juergensmeyer, supra note 12, at 236.
103. Comment, supra note 53, at 96.
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the ability of administrative agencies to represent the public interest in
pollution control that they have overemphasized the role of private liti-
gation.'"' One proposal, for example, urges legislative action aimed at
by-passing the administrative process so that citizen complaints may be
taken directly to the courts. 1 5
As is so often the case when there is a great divergence of opinion,
the best approach may involve a blend of several ideas. In relation to
the agencies charged with environmental protection, the judiciary occu-
pies a distinctly secondary position. While the standing of individual
citizens and citizens' groups to bring suit has been expanded greatly in
recent years,0 " the ability to get into court does not in itself solve the
underlying environmental problems.'"7 Moreover, the difficult burden of
proof on complainants,"0 s together with the rule that requires affirmance
of agency action if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record,0 9
means that judicial review often provides only limited protection. 0 This
will continue to be true, despite legislation such as the National Environ-
mental Policy Act"' that requires federal agencies to consider the envi-
ronmental impact of their actions before work is commenced rather than
104. Esposito, supra note 78, at 52. See also J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A
STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 115 (1970).
105. Such legislation, drafted by Professor Sax, was enacted in Michigan in 1970. MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1971). It has since been introduced in a number of other state
legislatures, as well as in the United States Congress.
106. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971); Crowther v.
Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in scattered sections of
42,49, 50 U.S.C.). But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
107. For example, in 1965 environmentalists won what seemed to be a resounding victory in
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), when the Second
Circuit held that they had standing to question the Commission's licensing of the Storm King
pump-storage project. In 1970, however, the Commission again approved the project after taking
a much closer look at available alternatives. See 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW S-75 (Supp. 1971).
108. See Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970).
109. E.g., Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
110. Reitze, Private Remedies for Environmental Wrongs, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 779, 790-
98 (1971). For a statement of the values of judicial review of agency action see Comment, The Role
of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1070 (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-35,4342-47 (1970).
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only after the damage is done.12 The fact that an agency's enforcement
procedure may be drawn out over a period of several years, however,
may lead to the use of agency standards as a basis for other sanctions,
such as the common-law negligence action. Violation of a state or fed-
eral pollution control standard may constitute negligence per se or at
least evidence of negligence," 3 and in a proper case it also may be used
to establish the maintenance of a public1 4 or private" 5 nuisance.
This brings us to the question of the environmental protection value
of the common-law remedies. These remedies provide the only means by
which injured individuals may recover damages, and in this regard they
supplement agency enforcement procedures. Moreover, the Oregon
cases,"' by opening the door for recovery of punitive damages, may serve
as a further deterrent to pollution.
Of the common-law actions available, the nuisance action has been
the most useful. The private nuisance suit may provide a means of suing
a governmental entity that would be immune to other types of action." 7
In most cases, however, the public nuisance action is more desirable
because the collective detriment to the entire community affected must
be considered and may make it less likely that the equities will be bal-
anced in favor of the polluter."' The public nuisance action has other
possible advantages as well. For example, it may avoid the defense of
prescription, since a polluter cannot gain a prescriptive right against the
public.
Other common-law actions, including trespass, negligence, and
strict liability are being allowed by sympathetic courts in some cases.
While this approach has not yet been adopted by the majority of Ameri-
can courts, it may reflect the judiciary's willingness to lend its aid to
environmental protection in appropriate cases. Furthermore, emphasis
on the factor of danger to public health is beginning to tip the scales in
112. See Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 36; cf. Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung
Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 17 (1966).
114. Cf. Department of Health v. Galazy Chem. Co., I Envir. Rep. Cas. 1660 (Md. Cir. Ct.
1970).
115. See Miller & Borchers, Private Lawsuits and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.J. 465
(1970).
116. Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 251 Ore. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968); McElwain v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966).
117. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
118. Reitze, supra note 110, at 805. See also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 238 (1907) (indicates reluctance to apply a balancing concept when the interests of an adjoining
state are involved).
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favor of injunctive relief'when balanced against economic interests." 9
Although courts once considered only the interests of the immediate
parties to the suit, they are now beginning to respond to the societal as
well as the private issues involved.120
Hopefully, the preceding materials have demonstrated that there is
still an important role for the judiciary to play in protecting the environ-
ment. In any particular case the problem eventually comes down to
selection of the best remedy. If an existing administrative agency has
adequate legal tools, sufficient financing, and a willingness to do the job,
the best remedy clearly may be an appeal to the agency.12' But if the
agency is not obtaining results, the common-law remedies administered
by a sympathetic judiciary may provide more adequate and timely relief.
A complainant should not be discouraged by allegations of compliance
with administrative pollution standards, since such standards usually are
held only to set minimum requirements, and a court can require more
of the polluter if it is reasonable to do So.12 2 In any event, it seems safe
to say that until we reach the millenium, the common-law remedies will
continue to play an important part in environmental protection.
119. See, e.g., Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 N.J. Super.
366, 242 A.2d 21 (1968).
120. For an excellent discussion of this trend see Juergensmeyer, supra note 12, at 230-33.
121. For example, the thorough revision of the Tennessee water pollution laws, which resulted
in the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1971, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-324 to -342
(Supp. 1971), has provided the necessary tools for prompt and adequate agency action.
122. W. PROssER, supra note 2, § 36. Indeed, even a legislative waiver of the standards may
not protect the polluter against a common-law action. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
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